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1. Introduction 
 
Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals has been criticized 
innumerable times since its publication. More or less malicious critics have 
maintained that there is a gap in one central argument of the work, that central 
claims are unjustified, untenable, or even morally dangerous, and so on. One severe 
critic of the Groundwork, however, was, its author himself, who a few years later 
pointed out that that work contained an “error” that had to be corrected (EEKU, 
AA 20: 200).2 The explicit retraction remained hidden for a long time in the 
unpublished version of the introduction to the Critique of the Power of Judgement 
(which was first published in its entirety in 1838 in the Rosenkranz-Schubert 
edition), and was not included in as strong terms in the printed version. The 
substance of the claims leading to the remark was maintained in the published 
work as well (cf. KU, AA 5: 172), along with some further significant 
dissimilarities. The target of Kant’s self-criticism is the account of the so-called 
hypothetical imperatives given in 1785. Thus, if the criticism is sound, it might be 
appropriate not to take some claims from the second section of the Groundwork as 
Kant’s last word on the matter.3 What Kant calls an error belongs the ideas of the 
Groundwork that every exposition of the work, and most presentations of Kant’s 
moral philosophy, touches upon. Now, according to Kant’s own later assessment, 
that part would be superseded by the correction provided in the introductions to the 
third Critique. 
In the following, I shall explore some of the main implications of this shift in 
Kant’s view. Kant’s change of mind on the matter has not been investigated 
                                                          
1 E-mail: stefano.bacin@unimi.it 
2 All references to Kant’s writings are given by volume and page number of the Academy Edition. The quotations 
are taken from the Cambridge Edition translations, where available. 
3 See now the perceptive analysis in Papish (2018). 
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enough, in spite of the fact that the systematic, albeit brief treatment of the matter 
in the Groundwork has been replaced by a corresponding one in a similarly 
prominent systematic position both in the Critique of Practical Reason (cf. KpV, 
AA 5: 20) and in the Metaphysics of Morals (cf. MS, AA 6: 222). A possible cause 
of the neglect for the effects of the revision might well be the implicit, yet still 
widespread assumption that Kant’s views on moral philosophy did not undergo 
significant changes after the Groundwork and, to some extent, the second Critique, 
if only because the Metaphysics of Morals is supposed not to be an innovative 
work in any respect. On the contrary, this issue provides one clear example of the 
dynamics of Kant’s thought and the importance of taking its development into 
account, showing how Kant’s revision of the theory of so-called hypothetical 
imperatives has an impact on his general conception of practical thinking and his 
consideration of prudence in particular. 
My primary focus shall be on the impact of Kant’s change of mind on his 
view of prudence, which has its locus classicus in Kant’s corpus exactly in the 
pages that the introductions to the third Critique address.4 Remarkably, the brief 
overview of practical principles given in the Metaphysics of Morals (cf. MS, AA 6:  
221f.) does not mention the precepts of prudence along with the imperatives of 
morality and the rules of skill, displaying a classification that seems hardly 
compatible with the account of the Groundwork. I shall suggest that the revision of 
the account of the so-called hypothetical imperatives leads to differentiate, and 
ultimately separate, two functions in prudence: the determination of individual 
ends through maxims and the pragmatic rules finding out means to reach those 
ends. Accordingly, as I shall argue, the revision changes the balance between skill 
and prudence as presented in the Groundwork, and a genuine structural distinction 
between the rules of prudence and skill goes missing. In Kant’s revised account, 
the only difference lies in the domain in which prudence unfolds, that is, the field 
of human relations, and in the relevant cognitions. 
 
2. Beyond Classification: Implications of the Revision 
 
In the first section of the unpublished introduction originally planned for the 
third Critique, Kant explains that the traditional distinction between theoretical and 
practical propositions has some ambiguity that hides the most important difference 
between conflicting grounds of determination of a will’s causal power. In order not 
to miss that distinction, the propositions of skill should be regarded not as practical 
                                                          
4 Schwaiger (1999) and Schwaiger (2002) provide a helpful reconstruction of the development of Kant’s view of 
prudence, which, however, is by and large limited to the time up to 1785 and, except marginal references to later 
writings, does not take the later development directly into account. Part of the aim of the present paper aims is to 
point out the main lines along which Kant's conception of prudence progresses after, and beyond, the standard 
account of the Groundwork. 
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in the strict sense, but as ‘technical’.5 This remark, Kant writes in a footnote, gives 
the opportunity to correct the “error” of the Groundwork concerning the non-moral 
imperatives: 
For after I had said that imperatives of skill command only conditionally, under the 
condition of merely possible, i.e., problematic, ends, I called such practical precepts 
problematic imperatives, an expression in which a contradiction certainly lurks. I 
should have called them technical imperatives, i.e., imperatives of art. (EEKU, AA 
20: 200) 
Kant now suggests that the label of problematic imperatives that he had 
earlier given to the rules of skill is in fact afflicted by a contradiction.6 The remark, 
however, is not entirely plausible, if only because it does not explain where should 
lies the contradiction in the thought that a rule is prescriptive only with respect to 
the intent to reach a specific end, which thus represents a contingent condition.7 
This is exactly the thought that most commentators of the Groundwork follow to 
explain the vocabulary that Kant introduces in those pages of its second section. At 
most, the conditional nature of those imperatives entail that they are not genuine 
commands, but Kant had already made this very point in the Groundwork (cf. 
GMS, AA 4: 416). Also, the imperatival force of the rules of skill had already been 
qualified in the second Critique, in which Kant had introduced for the propositions 
formerly known as hypothetical imperatives the term ‘precepts’ (Vorschriften) (cf. 
KpV, AA 5: 20), which remains in place in all later writings (cf. MS, AA 6: 221, 
also 6: 217, TP, AA 8: 288, VAMS, AA 23: 384). Moreover, in 1785 Kant had also 
dubbed 'technical' the imperatives of skill (cf. GMS, AA 4: 416). The alleged error 
would then appear to concern only a matter of terminology, at most a minor 
correction to an issue whose solution was in fact already given in 1785. This is 
probably why a reader of that passage is prepared to accept Kant’s remark, without 
dwelling too much on it. 
Kant’s correction does not gain in clarity or plausibility, furthermore, 
because he does not apply it to the analogous case of prudence. In fact, with regard 
to it the first Introduction seems to confirm the version of the Groundwork. Like in 
                                                          
5 For an overview of Kant’s notion of ‘practical’ and its different aspects, see Bacin 2015a. 
6 Prior to the Groundwork, Kant had already called their necessity problematic in the essay on the Evidence of the 
Principles (cf. 2: 298) and the Remarks on the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime: cf. 20: 
155. If only because of this, the correction in the first Introduction cannot be read as a return to his “precritical 
conception”, as Konstantin Pollok has suggested (see Pollok 2007, p. 68). Note that, however, Kant is reported to 
have presented the rules of skill as “problematic” again after the third Critique, according to the Vigilantius notes: 
cf. 27: 491. (See also Papish 2018, p. 306n.) 
7 The reading of Kant’s correction suggested by Papish (2018, p. 302) might be too charitable, as it does not seem 
well grounded in the text. Papish holds that “the notion of a ‘problematic imperative’ emphasizes the relationship 
between a human being and an objective law, or the conditions under which an imperative applies to us”, that of “a 
‘technical imperative’, by contrast, emphasizes that human action must in general be governed by technique, or the 
artifice exhibited by a craftsman”. Even if this should be true, this would explain a different accentuation on 
Kant’s part, but not why he intends to point out a contradiction in the notion of a problematic imperative. 
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1785, Kant highlights that the main distinctive feature of the prescriptions of 
prudence is that they, in contrast to those of skill, have to do not only with the 
prescription of the means to the intended end, but with the determination of the end 
in the first place: 
Only the fact that the end which we ascribe to ourselves and to others, namely that of 
our own happiness, does not belong among the merely arbitrary ends justifies a 
special designation for these technical imperatives; for the problem does not merely, 
as in the case of technical imperatives, require the manner of the execution of an end, 
but also the determination of that which constitutes this end itself (happiness), which 
in the case of technical imperatives in general must be presupposed as known. 
(EEKU, AA 20: 200; cf. GMS, AA 4: 418) 
At a first inspection, thus, the error that Kant is pointing out would not sound 
too serious, after all. One might even suspect that Kant’s (apparent?) self-criticism 
might rather be meant to hide a renewed endorsement of the central claims of the 
Groundwork, after the responses to several allegations in the second Critique. If the 
idea of a problematic imperative is the only error to be corrected, then the rest of 
the work, that is, its substantial content, must be quite right8. A comparison with 
the published version of the introduction might strengthen this impression. There, 
the explicit reference to the Groundwork disappears, as does any talk of an error to 
be corrected. In discussing the traditional distinction between theoretical and 
practical field, Kant maintains only the crucial point, already made in the 
unpublished version, that the rules of skill and prudence belong together in the 
category of what he now calls “technically practical rules”: 
All technically practical rules (i.e., those of art and skill in general, as well as those of 
prudence, as a skill in influencing human beings and their will), so far as their 
principles rest on concepts, must be counted only as corollaries of theoretical 
philosophy. (KU, AA 5: 172) 
                                                          
8 Note, furthermore, that some internal terminological unclarity affects the footnote about the “error” in the 
Groundwork. After the critical remark on ‘problematic’, a reader would expect a similar annotation regarding the 
label of assertoric that the Groundwork gives to the imperatives of prudence (cf. GMS, AA 4: 415), exactly 
because the relevant end is, in that case, “actual and thus even subjectively necessary”, as Kant writes in the first 
Introduction to the third Critique (EEKU, AA 20: 200). Oddly, ‘assertoric’ is not even brought up here. As Kant 
refers to the imperatives of prudence in that footnote, he calls them ‘pragmatic’ (cf. EEKU, AA 20: 200), using the 
term that already in the Groundwork he uses to differentiate the demands of prudence from those of skill, which in 
turn are already in 1785 called technical (cf. GMS, AA 4: 416f.; much the same, odd contrast between 
“problematisch-bedingt[e]” and “pragmatisch-bedingt[e]” imperatives occurs also in a draft for the Theory and 
Practice essay: cf. VATP, AA 23: 246. Cf. also the Vigilantius notes, V-MS/Vigil, AA 27: 491). Thus the true 
issue, in the first Introduction, seems to be not the rather marginal question of how to characterise the rules of 
skill, but rather that the logical vocabulary, so distinctive of the account of imperatives given in the Groundwork, 
has to be given up. (See also Aubenque 1975, p. 161, who however does not see the limits of Kant’s self-
criticism.) The only logical designation that sticks in later texts is, of course, that of categorical imperative. (On 
the role of logic as a background for Kant’s conception at the time of the Groundwork, see Bacin 2006, p. 104-
106, p. 136f.) 
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One might suppose that, had the alleged error been so serious, it certainly 
should have been considered also in the final version of the introduction. Since this 
is not the case, there would be no reason to see in those pages a genuine change of 
mind concerning the non-moral imperatives. In fact, the term ‘imperative’ does not 
occur at all in the entire third Critique. Kant only focuses on the distinction 
between technically practical and morally practical. A notable difference between 
the two versions of the introduction, however, lies in that the published text does 
not devote any attention at the distinction between prescriptions of skill and 
prudence. A contrast between them, such as that pointed out in the unpublished 
introduction—that, unlike skill, prudence has to determine its end and not merely 
to identify the appropriate means—, is no longer mentioned. In fact, brief remarks 
at the outset of the second Critique already suggested the same binary distinction, 
in which the specificity of the rules of prudence would vanish.9 There Kant wrote 
that imperatives are to be distinguished in two kinds:  
The first would be hypothetical imperatives and would contain mere precepts of skill; 
the second, on the contrary, would be categorical and would alone be practical laws. 
(KpV, AA 5: 20; my italics) 
In this respect, the Introductions to the third Critique unfold the view of 
practical principles briefly sketched in the second Critique. The account sketched 
in the two introductions to the third Critique, and somehow anticipated in the 
second, thus results in a twofold distinction of practical rules in the broadest sense, 
which appears to be made in increasingly sharper terms. This might be construed as 
a mere re-classification of the rules formerly known as imperatives, which are now 
differentiated according to a bipartite scheme instead of the tripartite distinction of 
the Groundwork.10 
Still, the matter at issue cannot be solved that easily. As so often in Kant’s 
thought, classifications and systematizations reflect a position on substantial issues. 
The apparently minor issue with the label to be used for imperatives of skill brings 
up more general questions, which affect the account of imperatives given in the 
Groundwork. Whereas the Groundwork and the first Introduction to the third 
Critique had differentiated between rules of skill and counsels of prudence, in the 
final Introduction the directives of skill and prudence are brought together under 
                                                          
9 Note that the discrepancies between the two versions of the Introduction and the closer similarity of the final 
version with the claims of the second Critique might suggest that the first, unpublished Introduction had been 
composed, at least in part, even before the second Critique. Here I cannot discuss the question, though. On the 
composition of the third Critique and the chronological position of the first Introduction in particular, see Tonelli 
1954 and Zammito 1992, p. 4f. Both Tonelli and Zammito, however, suggest that the first Introduction should 
have been written between early 1788 and 1789, that is, well after the publication of the second Critique. 
10 See e.g. Allison 2011, p. 158n., who notes in passing the transition from a tripartite to a bipartite classification 
after the Groundwork. 
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the common label of technically practical rules, to distinguish them from the 
morally practical norms. 
The relationship between prudence and skill was always particularly close, 
not merely because they were both construed as operating through conditional 
imperatives. Prudence (“in the narrowest sense”) was presented already in the 
Groundwork as a specific kind of skill, namely “the skill in the choice of the means 
to one’s own greatest well-being” (GMS, AA 4:416). The different status of their 
respective ends marked the conceptual distinction. Now, the bipartite re-
classification of practical principles introduced in the third Critique suggests some 
change that goes beyond that. One might still suspect that the distinction between 
skill and prudence is not brought up again in the published Introduction simply for 
reasons of space, and because it would not directly concern the (already broad) 
thematic scope of the third Critique, and it would thus not be necessary to dwell on 
that matter. But the same bipartite classification occurs again in the Metaphysics of 
Morals, where, in a context specifically devoted to the practical philosophy, Kant 
maintains that, besides the categorical imperative, “[a]ll other imperatives are 
technical and are, one and all, conditional” (MS, AA 6: 222; cf. 6: 221, and 6: 217 
f.)11. 
One of the implications of the new bipartite classification of rules for action 
is that the space for a distinction between skill and prudence like that made in the 
Groundwork and, again, in the first Introduction, now fades. If all non-categorical 
imperatives are in fact technical rules, then, where are to be placed the imperatives 
of prudence? Furthermore, the one difference following from the particular status 
of the end of one’s happiness is never mentioned again after the unpublished first 
Introduction to the third Critique. In fact, in the published version of the 
introduction Kant goes as far as maintaining that “the general doctrine of happiness 
itself or even the mastery of inclinations and the control of affects for the sake of 
the latter” are not different from “domestic, agrarian and political economy, the art 
of social intercourse, the prescriptions of dietetics”, insofar as “all of these contain 
only rules of skill, which are thus only technically practical” (KU, AA 5: 173, my 
italics). 
The bipartite distinction between technical and practical in the strict sense 
(technically practical vs morally practical) amounts to an implicit elimination of 
any ground for a structural distinction between prescriptions of skill and prudence. 
Even leaving aside the internal unclarity with the terminology that I have pointed 
out above (see footnote 7), this represents in fact a good reason for Kant not to 
bring up again the “error” of the Groundwork in the final version of the 
Introduction. If that error concerned only the label given to the rules of skill, it is 
                                                          
11 The binary contrast categorical imperatives of morality vs. technical rules also occurs in several of Kant’s drafts 
for the Metaphysics of Morals: cf. VAMS, AA 23: 384, 392. 
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superseded, along with its correction, once a genuine distinction between those 
rules and other prescriptions disappears. The new name of technically practical 
rules displaces both the labels used in the Groundwork and the related issues. 
In this respect, the revision of the notion of the ‘practical’ in the two 
Introductions to the third Critique has a significant impact on the conception of 
non-moral imperatives. More specifically, the relation between non-moral 
prescriptions is now seen from a slightly different standpoint, which accentuates 
some uncertainty in the status of prudence. In the following, I shall focus on two 
main aspects of this issue, namely how the task of prudence is conceived of, and 
how prudence relates to skill. 
 
3. Prudence Divided 
 
 The revision of the account of non-moral imperatives that is made explicit 
in the first Introduction to the third Critique brings an important difference between 
prudence and skill to the fore. A distinctive duplicity of prudence emerges there, to 
become more and more apparent in Kant’s later writings. As Kant remarks again in 
the footnote of the first Introduction from which I have begun my analysis, what 
characterizes prudence is that its task is not only to find out the best means to an 
end, but also the determination of the end itself (cf. EEKU, AA 20: 200). This 
crucial point marks not only a difference from skill, understood as merely focused 
on the right means to an end, but also a particular complexity in prudence in the 
first place. If it has both to determine an end and to discern how it is best attained, 
its task is, in fact, twofold. 
A distinction between determining ends and working out the appropriate 
means has already been recognized by Kant’s predecessors. For instance, 
Baumgarten mentions the connection between the wisdom that is about ends and 
their connection (sapientia) and the prudence that is about the means to them 
(prudentia).12 However, they are usually not understood as belonging to the very 
same ability. In contrast, Kant’s standard account in the Groundwork stresses the 
unity of prudence through these two tasks. The view of the Groundwork goes 
beyond the previous way of drawing the distinction between the two tasks insofar 
as it counters the then current assumption that prudence as such has only to do with 
discerning the best means to an end. For instance, Wolff defined prudence exactly 
in these terms, as the ability to find out the best means, adding that the act of 
discerning them is a counsel (cf. Wolff 1720, §§ 326-327).13 When Kant observes 
that “giving counsel does indeed contain necessity, but it can hold only under a 
                                                          
12 See Baumgarten 1763, §§ 103, p. 225. See Schwaiger 1999, p. 127; Schwaiger 2002, p. 152. 
13 Analogously, Crusius defines prudence as “the skill to choose and to apply good means to one's own final ends” 
(Crusius 1744, § 161). 
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subjective contingent condition, if this or that human being counts this or that as 
belonging to his happiness” (GMS, AA 4: 415), he elaborates on that conception.14 
Only, Kant points out that aiming at happiness makes all such prescriptions 
conditional, and therefore inadequate as expression of genuine moral demands. 
Once he separates the pursuit of happiness from morality, Kant has to include the 
necessary determination of that end in the domain of the same ability in charge of 
working out the means to attaining it. Since the pursuit of self-interest is not part of 
morality, the task of prudence cannot be only to work out how to best make one’s 
own interest, but has to include the individual determination of what belongs to 
one’s own best interest.15 
The Groundwork, therefore, had insisted on the peculiar status of the 
distinctive end of prudence, observing that prescriptions of prudence have to 
include a supposed solution to the “the problem of determining reliably and 
universally which action would advance the happiness of a rational being”, 
although that problem “is completely insoluble” (GMS, AA, 4: 418). However, in 
the standard account given in 1785, Kant played this important characteristic down, 
in order to stress the unity of prudence, although this structural duplicity was 
already present in Kant’s writings, also before 1785. In the first Critique, Kant 
observes that the doctrine of prudence includes both “the unification of all ends 
that are given to us by our inclinations into the single end of happiness and the 
harmony [Zusammenstimmung] of the means for attaining that end” (KrV A 800/B 
828). Also the ethics lecture notes report similar remarks; for instance: “For the 
rule of prudence there are two requirements: to determine the end itself, and then 
the use of means to this end” (27:246; cf. e.g. 27:124, 27:259). 
One way to recognize that Kant attributes to prudence a twofold task is to 
suggest that his notion of prudence has two different meanings, that is, that 
prudence can be both “instrumental rationality in the service of self-interest” and 
“context-sensitive judgment that considers the proverbial right means at the right 
time in the right place”16. But this would neglect that the two tasks do not run 
                                                          
14 For this reason, I disagree with Hinske’s claim that the notion of ‘counsel’ should have been, for Kant, a 
terminological innovation of the Groundwork (see Hinske 1989, p. 140). Even bracketing the previous important 
history of the distinction between counsels and commands, reaching from medieval theology to Christian 
Thomasius, a passage like that from Wolff’s German Ethics, along with similar definitions in the Wolffians, 
shows a very different picture, suggesting that Kant could presuppose that the term was well-known to his readers. 
15 Schwaiger remarks that “around the time of the Groundwork, the thought that the doctrine of prudence has to 
determine not only the means, but also the end of happiness” (Schwaiger 1999, p. 185). But the Groundwork itself 
insists that the peculiar status of the end of happiness directly affects the task of prudence, to which primarily 
belongs the necessary determination of that end (see GMS, AA 4: 418). Furthermore, the later writings certainly 
did not revoke that duplicity, as I shall show in the following. (See also Kain 2003, p. 259f.) On the contrary, the 
revision initiated by the first Introduction to the third Critique brings the duplicity of the task of prudence, of 
which Kant was already well aware, into the spotlight again. The result is that the two aspects of the task are 
considered more and more as separated. 
16 Nelson 2004, p. 307. See also p. 318, where Nelson speaks of “two notions of prudence.”  
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parallel to each other, but are closely connected in a complicated dynamic, in 
which they are often conceived of as two aspects of the same comprehensive task. 
More importantly, it would make impossible to see how the development of Kant's 
thought changes the balance between the two functions of prudence, which allows 
to discern contexts in which one view of prudence is pre-eminent with regard to the 
other. 
The peculiar status of the end of one’s own happiness requires that it be 
determined with regard to the individual subject’s own desires and inclinations. But 
this requires a different act than that of working out the best way to reach the goal 
that has thus been set. Determining the content of one’s own happiness seems 
significantly different from prescribing the best means to realize (part of) that 
content, and has an epistemically different basis. The former act consists in 
intending something, on the basis of one’s own desires, while the latter follows 
from the belief that a certain act, through a certain causal connection, would 
produce the best effect to attain the intended end.17 
The duplicity of the task makes it implausible to attribute both tasks to mere 
rules like the imperatives described in the second section of the Groundwork. In 
some cases, where he points out the twofold task of prudence, Kant would attribute 
its two aspects to different kinds of propositions:  
the doctrine of prudence provides laws as to what one should set happiness in; then 
rules to attain it [Die Klugheitslehre [gibt] einige Gesetze, worin man nemlich die 
Glükseeligkeit zu setzen habe; hernach regeln, sie zu erlangen] (Ref. 7030, AA 19: 
231)  
Kant would soon deny that prudence can provide genuine laws, but the point 
that the two tasks need principles of different status holds its validity. In fact, the 
very claim that non-moral imperatives are conditional insofar as they depend on a 
previously set condition implied that two different acts were required: first, the act 
of setting the condition, and second, the prescription following from that condition. 
Rules of prudence are not hypothetical because of the indeterminacy of the end of 
happiness, which makes them lack necessity.18 It is because they depend on a 
previous contingent act of willing, which is not identical with the subsequent act of 
prescribing the means to attain the intended goal. To be valid for an individual 
subject, thus, precepts of prudence call for a determination of the will.19 
The distinction between the two aspects of prudence is made easier by how 
the second Critique presents maxims. As Kant explains there, maxims, being 
practical principles, “contain a general determination of the will, having under it 
                                                          
17 See Schroeder 2015, p. 98. 
18 See e.g. Allison 2011, p. 157, arguably drawing on GMS, AA 4: 418, where, however, the indeterminacy of 
happiness explains why the imperatives of prudence are counsels, and not genuine commands.  
19 See Bojanowski 2006; Bacin 2006, p. 172-174. 
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several practical rules”. Specifically, unlike laws, maxims thereby set “a condition 
is regarded by the subject as holding only for his will” (KpV, AA 5: 19). The 
practical rules that are said to fall under higher-order principles like maxims (or 
laws) “prescribe […] action as a means to an effect”, and are imperatives. If they 
are conditional, they are better called precepts (KpV, AA 5: 20) and are in fact 
more precisely “mere precepts of skill” (KpV, AA 5: 20). Like in the final 
Introduction to the third Critique, thus, the supposedly specific imperatives of 
prudence vanish, as any distinction from those of skill dissolves20. In fact, the 
picture so rapidly sketched lacks any explicit reference to prudence. Yet, this 
reworking of the account of practical principles is best construed as providing 
(among other things) a solution to the issue of the duplicity of prudence. The task 
of discerning and prescribing means to an end on the basis of the subject’s beliefs 
and cognitions is carried out by precepts of skill. They come in once a condition is 
set, which can only happen if the subject’s desires are shaped into a general 
determination of the will, which Kant calls a maxim.  
Accordingly, when in the second Critique Kant comes to discuss the peculiar 
status of happiness as an end and the necessity of an individual determination (in 
the second remark to §3), precepts and prudence are not even mentioned. The main 
point is, instead, that an individual subject’s concept of happiness yields “merely 
subjective practical principles”, in which “it is expressly made a condition that they 
must have as their basis not objective but subjective conditions of choice, and 
hence that they must always be represented as mere maxims” (KpV, AA 5: 26). 
Adopting maxims is thus the act through which the primary task of prudence, that 
is, to determine the individual subject’s concepts of happiness, can be 
accomplished (cf. e.g. KpV, AA 5: 61)21. Notably, this way to frame the problem of 
determining the end — not through objective rules, but through subjective 
principles — leads Kant also to see that the problem is, in these terms, not 
“completely insoluble” (4:418), as he held in the Groundwork. It is ordinarily 
solved by every individual subject through his, or her, own maxims, although in a 
way that cannot possibly enjoy universal validity (cf. KpV, AA 5:25f.). 
The revision of the non-moral imperatives in the introductions to the third 
Critique and in the second Critique thus calls attention to a structural difference in 
prudence that the Groundwork aimed at presenting as non-essential. If the 
                                                          
20 Furthermore, in the very same pages Kant maintains that “practical cognition” has to do “only with determining 
grounds of the will” (KpV, AA 5: 21), which entails that what is usually called ‘practical’ but in fact follows from 
a previous determination of the will, falls rather in the field of theoretical cognitions, as a technical proposition 
(see also KpV, AA 5: 26f). Also with regard to this, the crucial distinction drawn in both Introductions to the third 
Critique develops the thought already in place at the beginning of the Critique of Practical Reason. 
21 Similarly, also Graband (2015, p.54f.) remarks that the role previously attributed to prudence is, in the second 
Critique, ascribed to maxims. Graband, however, equates them with counsels of prudence altogether, thereby 
overlooking the important duplicity of prudence, and the separation between their two original tasks that the 
introduction of ‘maxims of prudence’ entails.  
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Groundwork had left space for attributing to so-called hypothetical imperatives the 
task of organize the individual subject’s desires and determine his, or her, notion of 
happiness, the account sketched in the third Critique along the lines of the Critique 
of Practical Reason rules that out. The remarkable statements of the published 
Introduction follow from these considerations. The revision triggered by the self-
critical remarks in the first Introduction reverts that part of the view presented in 
the Groundwork, as it brings the duplicity of the task of prudence into focus again. 
On the one hand, the difficulty posed by the twofold task attributed to prudence in 
the Groundwork is solved by separating its two moments. On the other hand, the 
precepts of prudence can be associated with, and be regarded as identical to, rules 
of skill, as Kant does in his new bipartite classification of practical principles, 
because the preliminary task of determining the subject’s own concept of happiness 
can be now attributed to the subject’s maxims. Prudence is thereby divided in two 
distinct moments, which are tied by the closest connection, but are not regarded as 
expression of the same ability. After this revision, when the two tasks are 
mentioned together, they are remarkably not attributed to prudence anymore, as for 
instance in this passage from the Religion: 
This love [sc., self-love] is however rational to the extent that with respect to the end 
only what is consistent with the greatest and most abiding well-being is chosen, and 
that also the most apt means for each of these components of happiness are chosen. 
(RGV, AA 6: 45f) 
While some commentator has suggested that prudence risks of having no 
citizenship in the realms of nature and freedom22, prudence is rather to be regarded 
as enjoying a double citizenship of sorts, though at the price of separating its two 
traditional functions and ultimately giving up genuine unity. As to its precepts, 
prudence is to be regarded as a technical ability, once the unity of its two tasks is 
given up. If the task of determining the individual subject’s notion of happiness 
through setting ends is attributed to maxims, the precepts of prudence would be 
rules requiring the appropriate means, not unlike rules of skill. The bipartite 
classification that brings them together grounds on this assumption. This leads 
Kant, after the third Critique, to maintain a separation between the two tasks or 
prudence, thus considering it either regarding the determination of the end of 
happiness or with regard to discerning the best means to self-interest. 
 
4. “All others are technical imperatives”: (Worldly) Prudence and Skill 
 
The revision of the so-called hypothetical imperatives thus leads to notable 
changes in Kant's conception of prudence. The most significant of them consisted 
in bringing its inner duplicity to the foreground. This affects, in turn, how the 
                                                          
22 See e.g. Brandt 2005, p. 127. 
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relation of prudence to skill is to be construed. Since what attracts most of the 
attention, both in Kant and his readers, is the crucial distinction between morality 
and prudence, the relation between prudence and skill is not always very clear, and 
has scarcely been examined.23 Also in this respect, Kant's correction in the 
Introductions to the third Critique can help to shed some light on the issue. Again, 
Kant’s account is not developed as it would have been if his main aim were to give 
a full-blown theory of instrumental rationality, and its brevity makes some aspects 
less clear. Still, the unclarity about the relation between prudence and skill deserves 
further examination, as it affects the understanding of the role of prudence in 
Kant’s moral philosophy and pragmatic anthropology. 
The account that Kant rapidly sketched in 1785 aimed at harmonizing the 
complexity of the different forms of rational agency in a tripartite distinction in 
which skill, prudence, and morality appear co-ordinated like three species of the 
same genus. Their reduction to respective imperatival norms responds to the goal 
of highlighting an analogous fundamental structure of practical rationality that 
finally develops without limiting conditions only in morality. Accordingly, the 
account given in the second section of the Groundwork hides the diverse structural 
complexity that distinguishes prudence and skill. There, Kant only stresses the 
different character of the end involved in each case: contingent and merely 
potential for skill in general, actual and natural, if undetermined, for prudence. 
This, however, obscures that the contrast in the relation to the respective end goes 
beyond the mere modal status of the end itself and involves a higher complexity of 
the task in the case of prudence. The distinction of the two tasks of prudence, 
which I have pointed out in the previous sections, enables to separate the two 
functions responsible for them. The ability of finding out appropriate means to 
attain a given end can be clearly distinguished from the ability of setting ends.  
According to this division of labor, the search for appropriate means might 
even be considered in isolation from the specification of the general end of 
happiness through the determination of particular ends. For the ability of finding 
out effective means is not necessarily governed by self-interest, as it should be in 
the standard conception of prudence. It might simply be the ability of finding out 
effective means for given ends, period. But then is any distinction between 
prudence and skill ultimately withdrawn? If we bracket the necessity of 
determining the end of one's own well-being, as it belongs to a faculty responsible 
for harmonizing the individual subject's desires, then prudence in the strict sense, 
as it is in charge of working out the best means to the end that has been determined, 
can be regarded as belonging to skill altogether.  
This is exactly what the bipartite classification of practical rules introduced 
in the third Critique entails, after all. In fact, attributing prudence along with skill 
                                                          
23 For the state of the discussion, see Graband 2015, chapter 1. 
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in the strict sense to the domain of the ‘technical’, as Kant does starting from the 
published Introduction to the third Critique, amounts to describe prudence as a 
kind of skill, too. The standard definition of prudence given in the Groundwork 
was formulated already in terms of skill, of course (“the skill in the choice of the 
means to one's own greatest well-being”: GMS, AA 4: 416). However, once the 
differentiation of the two tasks weakens the unity of prudence and the distinctive 
feature that makes it something else than skill in general, the prudence that 
prescribes means for an end set by reason as belonging to the subject’s happiness 
has to be regarded as a kind of skill. Notably, in the Groundwork Kant had already 
taken this possibility into consideration: 
“The imperatives of prudence would totally and entirely coincide with those 
of skill [...], if only it were so easy to provide a determinate concept of happiness.” 
(GMS, AA 4: 417) 
A neat separation between skill and prudence as two distinct abilities would 
require a clear difference in the relation to the ends that respectively direct the 
abilities at issue. In Kant’s writings after 1790 this is not the case anymore. In a 
passage from the first Introduction that I have quoted above, Kant similarly 
observed:  
Only the fact that the end which we ascribe to ourselves and to others, namely that of 
our own happiness, does not belong among the merely arbitrary ends justifies a 
special designation for these technical imperatives. (EEKU, AA 20: 200; my italics)  
Once the status of the end of happiness and the necessity for each individual 
subject to determine its concept are considered separately, that simple distinction 
between skill and prudence is not viable anymore. That is, once the determination 
of the ends making up the individual subject’s concept of happiness is not 
attributed to the same ability that issues precepts regarding the best means, then the 
rules of prudence and those of skill appear not to be genuinely distinct.24 
Accordingly, “a special designation” for the precepts of prudence is not further 
needed, as they are to be understood as technical rules like those of skill. This is 
exactly what happens in the published Introduction to the third Critique. The 
binary classification that is maintained in all later writings, up to the Metaphysics 
of Morals (cf. MS, AA 6: 222) is to be interpreted against the backdrop of this re-
assessment. 
Kant never explicitly takes back a terminological distinction between 
prudence and skill, which after 1790 become the two forms of technical agency. 
Still, their distinction blurs to a significant extent, especially in contexts where the 
                                                          
24 Therefore I disagree here with Aubenque, who holds that, with the first Introduction, “la prudence est rejetée 
tout entière du côté de l’habileté,” so that its rules “ne se distinguent des autres règles techniques que par la 
circonstance plutôt aggravante de l’indétermination de leur fin” (Aubenque 1975, p. 163). Moreover, I shall soon 
point out a possible distinction between the two kinds of rules, still viable to Kant after 1790 (§ 4). 
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vocabulary is less adherent to the common linguistic usage, and needs thus not to 
keep track of what traditionally prudence is understood to be25. For instance, it is 
difficult to see how the “skill in acquiring some happiness” (TP, AA 8: 278) should 
be different from what Kant usually called prudence. Furthermore, in the later 
writings Kant remarkably often refers to the ability that a human being can make 
use of in pursuing his, or her, own well-being through an hendiadys: “skill and 
prudence”, which seems often to imply that it not possible, or not important, to 
distinguish the one from the other. This happens, for instance, when Kant explains 
that, like moral contentment, even a human being’s contentment with his, or her, 
own well-being, that is, is in fact “unattainable”. The proper object of contentment 
“from the pragmatic point of view” is one’s own well-being, that is, what one 
“intends to secure through skill and prudence” (Anth, AA 7: 234 f.; my italics). 
Analogously, in the essay on Theodicy, Kant argues that “we must judge all well-
being and ill merely as the consequence of the use of the human faculties according 
to the laws of nature, in proposition to the skill and prudence of their application 
[proportionirt ihrer angewandten Geschicklichkeit und Klugheit]” (MpVT, AA 8: 
262; my italics). The hendiadys would have been unthinkable before the revision of 
classification of the practical rules and the transition to the bipartite distinction. If 
Kant writes of “skill and prudence”, not merely in contrast to morality, but as 
converging in striving towards happiness, it is because he assumes a deep 
continuity between them.  
Skill, however, is a less specific term, which can be used in the plural too, to 
design specific skills. ‘Prudence’, instead, has no plural. Whereas in 1785 skill and 
prudence appeared as cognate kinds of a genus, Kant’s later writings suggest that 
prudence is rather to be described as a species belonging to the genus of skill, 
which is a general reason-guided ability to use the force and capacities that a being 
has or has developed as means to ends. Prudence is a species of that genus. Now, 
what is its specific difference? If there is any, the only definite distinction between 
skill and prudence concerns the respective domain of application and the 
corresponding relevant cognitions. Whereas skill in the strict sense can be 
understood as concerning the efficacious use of the force and abilities of the 
subject in general, prudence applies to the human world and interpersonal relations. 
This way to construe their relation emerges, for instance, when prudence is 
described as “the faculty of using one’s skillfulness [Geschicklichkeit] effectively 
on human beings” (Päd, AA 9: 455; my italics; cf. 15: 800, 15: 820, 25: 854, 25: 
                                                          
25 Incidentally, note that after 1785 Kant is increasingly willing to distance his vocabulary from that of his 
contemporaries. The specification of ‘practical’ through the distinction between ‘technical’ and ‘moral’, in order to 
correct a “great misunderstanding” (EEKU, AA 20: 195), is a case in point. Remarkably, Kant’s contemporaries 
both appreciated and rejected it for the same reason, namely that it corrected common language. See Niethammer 
1795, p. 350f. (in favour of Kant’s new distinction) and Platner 1800, p. 4f. (against it). 
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1037, 25: 1296, 25: 1481)26, as happens in On Pedagogy, immediately after the 
remark that “by means of formation towards prudence he is formed into a citizen, 
thus receiving public value” (Päd, AA 9: 455; see analogous remarks e.g. in 25: 
855, 25: 1296, 28: 333). Kant calls the instructions of prudence pragmatic, both 
before and after the third Critique, to stress this feature of prudence as concerning 
agency within human society.27 
Thus, where a distinction between skill and prudence has to be drawn, Kant 
implicitly goes back to what in the Groundwork he had called “worldly prudence” 
(Weltklugheit), in contrast to “private prudence [Privatklugheit]”. In a footnote in 
the Groundwork, Kant remarked that there is a difference between “the skill of a 
human being to influence others so as to use them for his purposes” and “the 
insight to unite all these purposes to his own enduring advantage”, and that “the 
latter is actually the one to which even the worth of the former is traced back” 
(GMS, AA 4: 416f). Now, after the growing separation between the two tasks of 
prudence, the skill to pursue one's own ends in interaction with others becomes 
more and more prominent in Kant's writings after 1790, when the matter is 
prudence28. This reversal is mostly implicit, but becomes tangible, for instance, in a 
draft for the Metaphysics of Morals, where the distinction made in the Groundwork 
simply disappears, and what there was worldly prudence, is now defined as 
prudence without further qualification: “prudence is the skill to use human beings 
(free beings) as means to one’s own purposes” (23:346; compare with GMS, AA 4: 
416f). Analogously, in a passage from the Anthropology, where Kant points out 
that human beings normally flourish in skill at twenty years of age and in prudence 
at forty, he defines prudence as the ability of “using other human beings for one’s 
purposes”, whereas skill in general is “the capacity to achieve any purpose one 
chooses [Kunstvermögen zu beliebiger Absicht]” (Anth, AA 7: 201). Here again the 
description of prudence echoes how worldly prudence is presented in the 
Groundwork. This represents a further change with regard to the account given in 
1785, which reflects some development in Kant’s view of agency. 
The new priority of worldly prudence follows from the focus on the means 
and the specific cognitions that are required to an agent whose ends are to be 
gained within the peculiar environment of human society. Accordingly, the only 
                                                          
26 Here the Cambridge Edition translation misses an important detail, which I have restored in the quote. The 
German original reads: “Klugheit ist das Vermögen, seine Geschicklichkeit gut an den Mann zu bringen” (italics 
added). The original phrasing stresses both that prudence has to be efficacious and that its efficacy concerns the 
human sphere. See also the remarks in Schwaiger 2002, p. 155f. 
27 On the complex meaning of the notion of ‘pragmatic’ in Kant, see Bacin 2015b. On this aspect in particular, see 
also Frierson 2003, p. 53f. 
28 On the emergence of the notion of worldly prudence in Kant up to the Groundwork, see Schwaiger 1999, p. 
124f. and Schwaiger 2002, p. 155. As I have mentioned before, Schwaiger’s reconstruction only includes marginal 
references to the post-1785 writings. The regained importance of worldly prudence after 1790 thus remains out of 
his picture. 
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relevant difference between skill and prudence as abilities to work out means lies 
in the sort of knowledge that is respectively required in the two cases: whereas skill 
requires knowledge of nature in a broad sense, prudence requires not merely 
knowledge of human nature, but specifically of human nature in society, with 
regard to responses within interpersonal relations29. A distinction between skill and 
prudence, thus, cannot regard the different status of their respective end, as Kant 
still holds in the first Introduction to the third Critique, but rather their field of 
application and the kind of competence required to work out the appropriate 
means. That the difference between skill and prudence is construed in these terms, 
can be shown also regarding the failure of the two abilities at issue. In a 
(presumably earlier) private note, Kant observed that “one is annoyed by his 
ineptitude [Ungeschicklichkeit], one is ashamed by his imprudence [Unklugheit]” 
(Ref. 6824, AA 19: 173). This remark does not entail any structural difference 
contrast the two kinds of ability, and can be construed perfectly well as reflecting a 
difference between domains of application. If, unlike skill, imprudence is shameful, 
it might be simply because it is an ineptitude that affects one’s position within the 
human community, wherein one's accomplishments or failures always suggest a 
comparison with others’. A failure before the fellow humans naturally provokes 
shame. Thus prudence is now construed as the kind of skill that implements 
cognitions about the human environment and the relations that occur within it. The 
project of a pragmatic anthropology as it was finally brought to realization is to be 
understood in this perspective30. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
The “error” in the second section of the Groundwork that Kant pointed out in 
the first introduction to the third Critique was not immediately so serious as the 
tone of that remark might suggest, but it proved to be rather significant for the 
revision that it contributed to initiate. While it did not affect Kant’s justification of 
the principle of morality, it did affect his view on non-moral agency and the best 
                                                          
29 See the perceptive remarks in Sturm 2009, p. 496f. However, Sturm stresses the epistemic difference between 
precepts of skill and prudence, denying that the latter essentially are about causal connections, which separates 
them from skill and the empirical sciences. While I agree with Sturm on his general analysis, I disagree on this 
specific issue. Nothing in Kant seems to corroborate this reading. On the contrary, it goes against Kant’s binary 
classification, which from 1790 on brings those kinds of rules together. That implies that their epistemic status is 
the same. In fact, the rules of prudence are about causal connections in a different domain than that of physical 
nature, which makes them more complex, but do not change that they are about causal connections. 
30 See for instance one of Kant’s handwritten notes: “Pragmatic anthropology. Prudence refers to the community in 
which we are with [other] human beings [Pragmatische Anthropologie. Klugheit geht auf die Gemeinschaft, darin 
wir mit Menschen stehen]”. In this respect, I do not find persuasive Norbert Hinske’s claim that pragmatic 
anthropology considers the human being “not anymore — or not primarily anymore — in relation to other human 
beings, but in relation to himself” (Hinske 1966, p. 425). The matter cannot be adequately discussed here, though. 
For a different perspective, see e.g. Frierson 2003. 
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way to construe it. If the matter addressed in the first Introduction to the third 
Critique appeared limited in scope and significance, it nevertheless allowed larger 
complications to emerge. The systematization of the practical domain that lies in 
the background of the Groundwork thus proved to be precarious.  
Although Kant never addresses it explicitly, especially his conception of 
prudence is affected by this development. The revision of the formerly so-called 
hypothetical imperatives yields a more complicated account, in which the 
traditional view of prudence as the ability to pursue self-interest is thus superseded 
by a more differentiated consideration, in which a new take on the twofold task of 
prudence eventually leads to separate its two functions. This reworking explains 
the otherwise extraordinary claims in the published Introduction to the third 
Critique, followed by corresponding claims in the Metaphysics of Morals, in which 
the account of the Groundwork appears much changed, without that immediately 
clear reasons for that are provided. A closer examination of the twofold task of 
prudence and of the relation between prudence and skill, finally, shows that the 
“error” pointed out in the first Introduction was not the only weak spot in the 
Groundwork that needed to be rectified, to Kant’s own lights. The account of non-
moral agency given in 1785 is thus significantly superseded by a different view in 
the later writings. A consideration of Kant’s view of prudence cannot be non-
specific, but should take this complex development into account. 
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Abstract: The paper examines Kant’s self-criticism to the account of hypothetical 
imperatives given in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Following his 
corrections in the introductions to the third Critique, the paper traces the consequences of 
that change in his later writings, specifically with regard to the status of prudence. I argue 
that the revision of the account of hypothetical imperatives leads to differentiate, and 
ultimately separate, two functions in prudence: the setting of ends through maxims, and the 
pragmatic rules establishing means to reach those ends. Accordingly, I furthermore argue, 
there is ultimately no genuine structural distinction between the rules of prudence and skill. 
The only difference lies in the domain in which prudence unfolds, that is, the field of 
human relations, and in the relevant cognitions. 
Keywords: Kant; Prudence; skill; hypothetical imperatives 
 
Recebido em: 11/2018 
Aprovado em: 01/2019 
 
